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WHAT ABOUT UNCLE SAM? CARVING A NEW PLACE FOR THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL CLIMATE LITIGATION
ZACHARY L. BERLINER*
The window to combat global climate change is rapidly closing. Yet, the Trump
Administration and Republican-controlled Congress have made clear that the federal government
will do little on this front. In response, citizens have taken to the courts, invoking the ancient
public trust doctrine &“PTD”%'the idea that a government holds resources in trust for its
citi)ens’ *elfare'to compel government action on climate change. Although modestly successful
at the state level, the PTD has thus far failed to establish a public trust on the part of the federal
government. Namely, the D.C. Circuit in its 2014 decision Alec L. v. Jackson held that such a
federal public trust is both displaced by the Clean Air Act and foreclosed by a Supreme Court
statement that the PTD is a matter of state law unaffected by the U.S. Constitution. Yet Juliana v.
United States, a November 2016 decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon,
may have turned the tide. In Juliana$ Judge Ann Aiken denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
claims against the U.S. government, framing the PTD’s role in climate change as an issue of
Constitutional Due Process. This Note argues that the Juliana court got it right: the PTD does
apply to the federal government. It limits the federal government’s po*er such that it cannot be
legislated away in statutes such as the Clean Air Act. Alec L. thus misinterpreted the Supreme
Court statement on the PTD$ and the statement is unsupported by the Court’s o*n precedent.
Moreover, this Note argues that the PTD predates and is preserved by the U.S. Constitution,
which guarantees the substantive due process right to a clean environment via the Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. If the plaintiffs succeed at trial and on an expected appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, Juliana *ill surely be *orthy of its recent title of “the case of the century.”
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INTRODUCTION
Global climate change has been recognized as a priority in the international community,
as indicated by 195 of the world’s 197 nations that signed on to the 2016 Paris Agreement.1 Yet in
the United States, efforts on the part of the federal and state governments to combat climate
change have been scattershot and slow to materialize. Moreover, given Republicans’ victory in the
November 2016 elections, it seems improbable that any climate-related legislation will be enacted
by President Donald Trump or the governors of many states, let alone considered by Congress or
such state legislatures.
In response, American citizens have taken to the courts to hold their governments
accountable for climate change action.2 One basis for citizens’ arguments has been the public trust
doctrine (“PTD”). This strategy has not enjoyed uniform success in state courts.3 At the federal
level, the PTD has similarly not fared well in efforts to compel action on the part of the United
States government. Yet the recent decision on a motion to dismiss in Juliana v. United States
(“Juliana”) may illuminate a path forward by reframing the PTD as an issue of constitutional
rights.4 Framing the PTD in this way offers a potential means to hold the federal government
accountable for climate change impacts.
The result of Juliana may significantly influence United States climate change policy in
the twenty-first century, given the Trump administration’s resistance to federal climate change
action. If successful, Juliana will establish for the first time in American jurisprudence that the
United States has an obligation—under the PTD and reinforced by the U.S. Constitution—to
protect the rights of its current and future citizens to a clean environment and stable climate
system. This would be a more efficient alternative to the current strategy of suing in state courts;
1 Paris Agreement ( Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (last
visited Apr. 2, 2018), http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php.
2 Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL .L. 7, 7 (2013).
3 Compare Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (holding
that courts cannot intervene to impose a common-law public-trust duty on the state to regulate atmospheric greenhouse
gases), with Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (recognizing that
the state has a public-trust duty to protect natural resources from climate change).
4 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016).
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the effects of climate change know no state borders, so neither should climate policy.
This Note analyzes the legal viability of using the PTD to compel the United States
government to mitigate climate change, focusing on two decisions by federal courts on the issue.
The first is Alec L. v. Jackson (“Alec L.”), a 2012 decision in which the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia rejected the argument that the federal government has a public trust
obligation to combat climate change.5 The second is Juliana, a November 2016 decision in which
Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon denied a motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ claims that the federal government does have such an obligation.6
This Note begins with a summary of the theoretical and historical underpinnings of the
PTD. Following is an overview of federal cases which have considered the PTD—originally with
respect to the states, but recently with respect to the federal government. Next, this Note argues
that the Juliana court was correct and the Alec L. court incorrect: the federal government has an
unmistakable obligation to the nation’s citizens under the PTD to combat climate change.
Concluding is a commentary on how the PTD may fare in future federal climate change litigation.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. What is the Public Trust Doctrine &“PTD”%#
The PTD embodies the notion that a sovereign entity such as a state government cannot
grant away its core sovereign powers.7 In the natural resources context, this concept has been
interpreted to mean that a sovereign holds title to property—”public trust resources”—in trust for
the benefit of its citizens, the beneficiaries.8 The sovereign owes an equal duty to future
generations of beneficiaries as well.9 This arrangement restrains the sovereign’s ability to alienate
and degrade such resources to ensure public access to and enjoyment of them.10
The PTD originates from the Institutes of Justinian, the ancient body of Roman law that
is the “foundation for modern civil law systems.”11 The Institutes of Justinian stated that “the
following things are by natural law common to all—the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the seashore.”12 The PTD then made its way to the United States through English
common law governing public navigation and fishing in tidal lands, which granted title to such
lands to the King.13 After the American Revolution, these rights were vested in the original states
of the United States within their respective borders.14 The states’ right to use or dispose of these
5 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d. 11, 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v.
McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014).
6 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233–34.
7 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880).
8 Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
10 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (citing PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012)).
11 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (quoting Timothy G. Kearley, Justice Fred Blume and the Translation
of Justinian’s Code, 99 L. LIBR. J. 525, ¶ 1 (2007)).
12 Id. (quoting J. Inst. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans.)).
13 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
14 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997); Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484
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tidal lands has since been limited to the extent that it would cause “substantial impairment of the
interest of the public in the waters.”15 In addition, the states must yield to “the paramount right of
[C]ongress to control . . . navigation [in tidal waters] so far as may be necessary for the regulation
of commerce with foreign nations and among the states.”16 The PTD thus finds its conceptual
roots in the states’ historical obligation to ensure public access to and enjoyment of tidal waters.17
B. State Public Trust ( Illinois Central
The seminal U.S. Supreme Court case recognizing state public trust obligations is Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois (“Illinois Central”).18 In that case, the Illinois legislature granted
Illinois Central title to submerged lands beneath the Chicago Harbor, intending to give the
railroad company control over the waters above the submerged lands “against any future exercise
of power over them by the state.”19 The Court held that this attempted legislative conveyance was
void: “[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in
the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”20 Given that Chicago’s
harbor was “of immense value to the people of . . . Illinois,” the “idea that its legislature can
deprive the state of control over its bed and waters, and place the same in the hands of a private
corporation” could not “be defended.”21 In short, the Court felt that the harbor’s natural resources
were so vital that the state could not simply legislate away its public trust obligations to protect
them for its citizens’ welfare.
C. Federal Public Trust
Illinois Central made clear that the states have obligations under the PTD. Whether such
obligations exist for the federal government is not so clear, however, as evidenced by two recent
federal cases on the issue. The first case, Alec L.,22 foreclosed the existence of a federal public
trust as preempted by the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Yet the second, Juliana,23 rejects the reasoning
of Alec L., holding that the PTD inheres in and restrains a government’s sovereignty—and thus
cannot be legislated away.
i. Two Recent Cases – Alec L. & Juliana
One effort to extend the PTD in this manner with respect to climate change failed in Alec
U.S. 469, 473 (1988).
15 Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
16 Id.
17 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
18 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 433.
19 Id. at 452.
20 Id. at 453.
21 Id. at 454.
22 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d. at 11.
23 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1258–59 (D. Or. 2016).
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L.24 Alec L. was a 2012 decision in which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the PTD imposes a duty on the federal government to
prevent the release of atmospheric greenhouse gases.25 The plaintiffs in Alec L., five young
citizens and two advocacy organizations, sued the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) and the heads of five other federal agencies.26 They alleged that each agency,
representing the federal government and through permitting and approval actions, allowed the
atmosphere to become polluted with high levels of human-caused carbon dioxide (“CO2”).27 As
such, the defendants “wasted and failed to preserve and protect the atmosphere Public Trust asset”
in violation of their “fiduciary duties under the Public Trust Doctrine as trustee of the natural
resources of the United States.”28 The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief for
their claim—specifically, a declaration of the federal government’s fiduciary role in preserving
the atmosphere and an injunction of its actions which contravene that role.29
Since Alec L. was decided, there has been a successful attempt to not only rekindle the
PTD argument but incorporate constitutional claims to compel the federal government to combat
climate change. Such a victory (albeit a procedural one) occurred in Juliana, in which Judge Ann
Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon denied a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims that the federal government, as represented by the agency defendants, willfully
and knowingly acted or failed to act so as to accelerate climate change.30 The plaintiffs also allege
that the government violated several of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as well as the PTD.31
The plaintiffs in this suit include individuals aged eight to nineteen, associations of activists, and
Dr. James Hansen, the well-known climatologist, on behalf of “future generations.”32
24 See Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d.
25 See id. at 11.
26 The plaintiffs joined as defendants the respective heads of the U.S. Departments of the Interior,
Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and Defense. See id. at 12.
27 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 138, 146. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 10,
138, 146. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:2011CV022), 2011 WL 11547727.
28 Id. The plaintiffs did not highlight any specific acts on the part of any of the five defendant agencies
which led to a violation of their public trust obligations to protect the atmosphere and subsequently injured the plaintiffs in
the manner they alleged. See id.
29 The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a declaration that the atmosphere is a public trust resource that the
federal government, as a trustee, has a fiduciary duty to refrain from damaging. Id. at ¶ 13. They also requested that the
court issue an injunction directing the defendant agencies to act to ensure that CO2 emissions peak by December 2012 and
then decline by six percent annually beginning in 2013 until the global atmospheric concentration of CO2 is 350 parts per
million. Id. at ¶ 14.
30 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
31 Id. at 1233. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the federal government’s actions and omissions have
increased CO2 emissions in a manner that “shocks the conscience” and infringes the plaintiffs’ right to life and liberty in
violation of their substantive due process rights. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 85, 87, Juliana v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC). The plaintiffs also allege an equal protection
violation under the Fifth Amendment due to the defendants’ denying the plaintiffs and their generation protections
afforded to earlier generations. Id. at 89. Lastly, the plaintiffs allege two violations of the Ninth Amendment, the first
based on their right to a stable climate and an atmosphere free of excessive CO2, and the second on the federal
government’s denying future generations the enjoyment of vital natural resources in violation of the PTD. Id. at 92–93.
32 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233–34.
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ii. Supreme Court Statement in PPL Montana
Central to the holdings in Alec L. and Juliana on the PTD was a statement by the U.S.
Supreme Court in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana (“PPL Montana”) that “the public trust
doctrine remains a matter of state law” whose “contours . . . do not depend upon the
Constitution.”33 In PPL Montana, the State of Montana sought rent from the plaintiff power
company for the use of riverbeds, arguing that it had acquired title to the rivers via the “equal
footing doctrine” upon its statehood in 1889.34 The Supreme Court held that Montana state courts
had applied an incorrect methodology in determining whether the rivers were “navigable,” as
required under the equal footing doctrine.35
In addition to its navigability argument, Montana asserted that denying it title to the
riverbeds would “undermine the public trust doctrine.”36 The Supreme Court rejected this,
responding with the statement interpreted in Alec L. and Juliana: the PTD, unlike the equal
footing doctrine, is a matter of Montana law unaffected by the U.S. Constitution.37 Rather, in the
Court’s view, “[t]he States retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over
waters within their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing
doctrine.”38
The Alec L. court found this language to be unambiguous and binding, concluding that it
foreclosed the plaintiffs’ public trust claim.39 Moreover, the court stated that it is irrelevant that
the statement was dictum, citing its prior holding that Supreme Court language—including
dictum—”must be treated as authoritative.”40 The court even felt that the statement was
persuasive, as it held in a previous case that “[i]n this country the public trust doctrine has
developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.”41
Conversely, in Juliana, Judge Aiken asserted that PPL Montana said nothing about the
viability of federal public trust claims.42 Instead, in her view, PPL Montana was about the equal
footing doctrine, not the PTD.43 The Supreme Court was only clarifying that “federal law, not
state law, determined whether Montana has title to the riverbeds,” and that “if Montana had title,
state law would define the scope of Montana’s public trust obligations.”44 This was logical to
Judge Aiken, as the PPL Montana court was tasked with applying the PTD to a state rather thanto
33 PPL Mont., LLC. v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603–04 (2012) (emphasis in original).
34 Id. at 580. The “equal footing doctrine” is embedded in the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3,
c1. 1, and provides that a state takes title to all riverbeds of navigable waters upon statehood, United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 59 (1926).
35 PPL Montana,, 565 U.S. at 589–90.
36 Id. at 1221.
37 Id. at 1235.
38 Id.
39 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d. 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012).
40 Id. (quoting Overby v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 595 F.3d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
41 Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in
original).
42 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1256 (D. Or. 2016).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1257.
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the federal government.45 She saw no reason why the PTD, given its deep roots in our nation’s
civil law system, would apply only to the states and not to the United States government.46
iii. Displacement by Federal Statute
Alec L. and Juliana also came to differing conclusions on the issue of whether the CAA
displaces plaintiffs’ common law rights under the PTD given the Supreme Court’s decision in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).47 In AEP, the plaintiffs alleged that the five
defendant power companies’ CO2 emissions constituted a public nuisance under federal common
law.48 The Supreme Court struck down the claim, holding that “the [CAA] and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of [CO2] emissions from
fossil-fuel fired power plants.”49
From this, the Alec L. court concluded that the plaintiffs’ public trust claim was similarly
displaced by the CAA.50 The court also noted that AEP does not only apply to common law
nuisance claims but rather to any federal common law right associated with the CAA.51
Additionally, the court echoed the AEP court’s concerns that “the judgments the plaintiffs would
commit to federal judges . . . cannot be reconciled with the decision-making scheme Congress
enacted,”52 and that Congress designated EPA as the primary regulator of greenhouse gas
emissions because it “is surely better equipped to do the job than individual district judges issuing
ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions.”53 In essence, the court believed that it was beyond the scope of
its power to direct a federal agency to regulate when Congress has already delegated such
authority to an agency with greater expertise on the matter.54
In Juliana, Judge Aiken disagreed with the Alec L. court, reasoning that the Supreme
Court did not consider a public trust claim in AEP.55 Displacement analysis, in her view, does not
apply to public trust claims because “they concern inherent attributes of sovereignty”—imposing
obligations on the government that “cannot be legislated away” in statutes such as the CAA.56
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1259.
47 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
48 Id. at 415.
49 Id. at 424.
50 Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d.11, 16 (D.D.C. 2012).
51 Id.
52 Id. (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. at 429).
53 Id. at 428. In further support of its conclusion that the CAA displaces public trust claims, the court cited
the prior Supreme Court holding under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007) that EPA has the authority
under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.
54 Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d. at 17.
55 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016).
56 Id. Judge Aiken also concluded that the court’s fashioning of a proper remedy here would not implicate
nonjusticiable political concerns better left to the political branches of government, citing her thorough discussion in an
earlier part of the opinion. See id. at 1236–42. In her analysis, she applied the six factors laid out by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). She thereafter concluded that there are no political questions here because, “[a]t
its heart, this lawsuit asks this Court to determine whether defendants have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights,” which
is “squarely within the purview of the judiciary.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d at 1241 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
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iv. Juliana Due Process Considerations
Juliana also situated the plaintiffs’ public trust claim as a matter of substantive due
process under the U.S. Constitution, rendering it enforceable in federal court. Earlier in her
opinion, Judge Aiken recognized a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution to a stable climate system.57 In so holding, she cited the landmark
Obergefell v. Hodges decision and its reasoning that marriage is a right underlying other vital
liberties already recognized in the Constitution.58 From this she concluded that, like marriage, “the
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered
society . . . [and] is quite literally the foundation of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”59
Judge Aiken subsequently held that the plaintiffs have a cognizable cause of action to
enforce federal public trust obligations because “plaintiffs’ public trust rights both predated the
Constitution and are secured by it.”60 First, Judge Aiken stated that public trust rights are related
to “inherent aspects of sovereignty and the consent of the governed from which the United States’
authority derives”—in other words, the Constitution enshrines already-existing rights under the
ancient PTD, and the government’s power to protect those rights under the Social Contract theory
“cannot be sold or bargained away.”61 She concluded from this that the plaintiffs’ public trust
rights are also protected under the Ninth Amendment, as they are not enumerated in the
Constitution.62 Second, as noted above, such rights are contained in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.63 In combination, these findings led Judge Aiken to hold that the plaintiffs’
public trust claims, as a matter of due process, are cognizable in federal court.64
II. ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING THE PTD TO CLIMATE IMPACTS
In this section, this Note argues that the Juliana court correctly recognized that the
United States government is, like the states, obliged under the PTD to provide a stable climate
system for its current and future citizens. This section begins by discussing why the Supreme
Court’s statement in PPL Montana that the PTD is a matter of state law is unreliable—it is based
on a string of prior cases which have misinterpreted Illinois Central as a statement of state law,
941 (1983)). Moreover, there are no constitutional provisions or acts of Congress which reserve all decision-making
authority relating to climate change to any one political branch. Id. at 1238. She also explained that the court can order the
defendants to implement a plan that would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries without specifying exactly what methods that
plan would contain. Id. at 1242.
57 See id. at 1248–52 for Judge Aiken’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ due process claims.
58 Obergefell v. Hodges,135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
59 Juliana, 217 F. Supp.3d 3d at 1250.
60 Id. at 1260 (citing Gerald Tones & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 288–94 (2014)).
61 Id. at 1261.
62 Id.
63 Id
64 Id. at 1259; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (“[T]he victims of a constitutional
violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any
statute conferring such a right.”).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol21/iss4/3
2018] WHAT ABOUT UNCLE SAM? 347
when it is in fact premised on federal law. Next, this Note cites numerous holdings by the
Supreme Court and other federal courts that have recognized a federal public trust. It then argues
that federal statute does not displace the PTD because it is an inherent limit on sovereignty that
cannot be legislated away. Following is a discussion of how the PTD both predates and is
preserved by the U.S. Constitution as a matter of substantive due process under the Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. This section concludes by considering the practical, political, and
public policy implications of Juliana.
A. Existence of a Federal Public Trust
i. Supreme Court Statement in PPL Montana
The Supreme Court’s passing statement in PPL Montana that “the public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law” cannot be read to foreclose the existence of a federal public trust.
Judge Aiken’s treatment of this language in Juliana is therefore correct, whereas the Alec L.
court’s is misguided. The Juliana court correctly concluded that PPL Montana has no bearing on
whether the PTD binds the federal government. PPL Montana only concerned whether the State
of Montana owned riverbeds within its borders—a claim against a state government. In response
to Montana’s public trust argument, the Supreme Court stated that Montana was conflating its
rights under the equal footing doctrine—determined by the U.S. Constitution—with its rights
under the PTD—in that case, determined by Montana law. Juliana and Alec L., on the other hand,
concern claims against the federal government. Thus, the Alec L. court misconstrued the Supreme
Court’s statement in PPL Montana to limit the scope of the PTD to states only. There is nothing in
PPL Montana indicating that the Supreme Court felt that the PTD applies exclusively to the states.
Rather, the Court was simply evaluating the claims before it; it did not have occasion to consider
the existence of a federal public trust. There is little sense in a court concluding from PPL
Montana that the PTD applies to only the states and not to the United States when the Supreme
Court did not have before it a claim against a federal actor. Such a conclusion seems even less
wise considering the PTD’s ancient roots.65
It appears that the district court in Alec L. even misinterpreted its own circuit’s precedent
on the matter. It is true that the D.C. Circuit stated in Air Florida that “[i]n this country the public
trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.”66 However, the court
later made it a point to emphasize that “we imply no opinion regarding either the applicability of
the public trust doctrine to the federal government or the appropriateness of using the doctrine to
afford trustees a means for recovering from tortfeasors the cost of restoring public waters to their
pre-injury condition.”67 This statement is undeniably clear. It was erroneous for the Alec L. court
to rely on Air Florida in concluding there is no federal public trust when the Air Florida court
expressly declined to inquire into that matter. Courts should thus not construe Air Florida to
preclude the existence of a federal public trust; in fact, they can cite the D.C. Circuit’s statement
in support of the existence of a federal public trust in a wholly new context such as climate
change.
65 See supra Part II.A.
66 750 F.2d at 1082.
67 Id. at 1084.
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ii. Misinterpretations of Illinois Central
In a string citation supporting its statement that the PTD is a matter of state law, the PPL
Montana court cited two Supreme Court cases, Appleby v. City of New York (“Appleby”)68 and
Coeur d’Alene,69 which stated—without explanation—that Illinois Central “was necessarily a
statement of Illinois law.”70 However, as explained below, Illinois Central was based in federal
law, not Illinois law. Coeur d’Alene and Appleby thus misinterpreted Illinois Central, which in
turn led the PPL Montana and Alec L. courts astray.
Contrary to subsequent judicial interpretation, Illinois Central was grounded in federal
law71 and thus does not foreclose the existence of a federal public trust. The Supreme Court in
Illinois Central held that the Illinois legislature could not grant a private company title to the
waters of the entire Chicago Harbor, as such would violate the state’s public trust obligations.72
However, the Court cited no state law as the origin of this trust.73 It also went on to expand such
public trust obligations to any state74—again, without mentioning state law.75 Additionally, earlier
in the opinion, the Court stated that “[i]t is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several
states, belong to the respective states within which they are found. . . .”76
Due to this lack of reference to state law and broad-reaching language, commentators
have looked to federal law as the basis for Illinois Central. For example, some suggest that Justice
Field, the author of the Illinois Central decision, was relying on the reserved powers doctrine of
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which, like the PTD, recognizes inherent limits on
sovereignty that both state legislatures and Congress cannot supersede.77 Others believe that the
public trust is an implied condition of statehood imposed by the federal government, the purpose
being to keep crucial navigable waterways free from obstruction.78 Irrespective of which source is
correct, one thing remains clear: Illinois Central is not premised on state law.
Despite Illinois Central’s federal basis, the Supreme Court thereafter stated in Appleby
that Illinois Central was premised on Illinois law. This assertion is misguided, as the claim before
the Appleby court did not involve the PTD. Rather, the Court enjoined the City of New York’s
dredging on Appleby’s tidal property, holding that it unconstitutionally interfered with his
68 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
69 521 U.S. at 285.
70 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012).
71 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL.
L. 453 (1989); Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice
Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 410–15 (2015).
72 Id. at 410; see supra pp. 4–5 for a summary of the facts and holding of Illinois Central.
73 See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455 (“We cannot, it is true, cite any authority where a grant of this kind
has been held invalid. . . .”).
74 See id. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a state has never been adjudged to
be within the legislative power . . . “ and is against its public trust obligations.) (emphasis added).
75 See id. at 453–56 (citing no state law imposing public trust obligations).
76 See id. at 435 (emphasis added).
77 See BLUMM & SCHAFFER, supra note 71, at 412–13.
78 SeeWILKINSON, supra note 71, at 453, 458.
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contract rights granted to him by the City.79 In reaching its conclusion, the Court did not consider
whether the state’s original grant of the submerged land to the city implicated the PTD; the suit
only involved Appleby’s request for injunctive relief.80 Despite this, the Court puzzlingly stated in
passing that “the conclusion reached [in Illinois Central] was necessarily a statement of Illinois
law.”81 The Court did not cite any state law or otherwise include any analysis in support of this
statement. It then in the same sentence contradicted itself: “but the general principle [from Illinois
Central] . . . ha[s] been recognized the country over”82—seemingly a recognition of Illinois
Central’s federal nature. If not, this at least demonstrates that the Court’s treatment of the PTD in
Appleby is flawed and therefore unreliable.
The Supreme Court subsequently cited this misguided conclusion from Appleby in Coeur
d’Alene, although that case did not elaborate on the terse statement or even involve the federal
government.83 Moreover, the Court again downplayed the Appleby statement’s state-law focus,
adding (also in the same sentence) that “[Illinois Central] invoked the principle in American law
recognizing the weighty public interests in submerged lands.”84
It is thus clear that the PPL Montana court was imprudent in relying on Appleby and
Coeur d’Alene for its assertion that the PTD is a matter of state law. It invokes a line of Supreme
Court cases which misconstrue Illinois Central’s federal basis as a state one. Those decisions also
were unrelated to the PTD and qualified the doctrine’s supposed grounding in state law
immediately after stating it. These cases therefore do not stand against the existence of a federal
public trust, contrary to what the Alec L. courts believed.
iii. Federal Cases Recognizing a Federal Public Trust
Multiple federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized the existence of
federal public trust obligations throughout American history. Such decisions, by logical extension,
support the Juliana and Alec L. plaintiffs’ assertion that the federal government has a public trust
duty to combat climate change.
The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has acknowledged a federal public trust. For
example, in United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co. (decided two years before Illinois
Central), the Court held that, with respect to the disposal of abandoned coal lands, “the
government should not be regarded as occupying the attitude of a mere seller of real estate for its
market value . . .” because “[the lands] were held in trust for all the people. . . .”85 In 1911, the
Court subsequently reiterated this holding, stating that “[a]ll public lands of the nation are held in
trust for the people of the whole country” in a case upholding the Forest Service’s authority to
impose criminal sanctions for violations of grazing regulations.86 The Court saw private
79 Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 402–03 (1926).
80 Id. at 399–403.
81 Id. at 395.
82 Id.
83 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997).
84 Id. (emphasis added).
85 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) (emphasis added).
86 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (quoting United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co.,
137 U.S. 160 (1890)).
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proprietary ownership of the public lands, on the other hand, as reminiscent of the English
aristocracy and felt that “the United States do[es] not and cannot hold property as a monarch may,
for private and personal purposes.”87Similarly, as Judge Aiken discussed in Juliana, two federal
courts have acknowledged the existence of federal public trust obligations when the federal
government reacquired tidelands through eminent domain from a state.88 The District Court for
the District of Massachusetts in United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in City of Boston,
Suffolk County, Mass. explained that “[t]he trust is of such a nature that it can be held only by the
sovereign, and can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.”89 In other words, as the
District Court for the Northern District of California put it, “[b]y condemnation, the United States
simply acquires the land subject to the public trust as though no party had held an interest in the
land before.”90
These cases are also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. 32.42
Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in San Diego County, Cal., although that court cited the
PPL Montana language that the “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”91 In
32.42 Acres of Land, the federal government, through its eminent domain power, acquired
tidelands originally granted to California by the equal footing doctrine upon obtaining statehood
in 1850.92 In upholding the acquisition, the court held that the federal government obtains land
from the states free of state public-trust obligations.93 This is because federal takings, via the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, necessarily supersede any public trust obligations
under state law.94 Yet the court did not address the lower court’s finding that the tidelands at issue
had been taken subject to a federal public trust.95 The Ninth Circuit thus left open the possibility
of there being a federal public trust despite its opportunity to hold otherwise.
The above precedents demonstrate that the Supreme Court and numerous lower federal
courts have recognized public trust obligations on the part of the federal government. At the very
least, courts can leverage the Supremacy Clause in federal takings cases to extinguish the state
public trust and invoke in its place a federal public trust to restrict the federal government’s
actions with respect to tidelands. This all, in turn, further supports Juliana’s recognition of a
similar federal trust obligation to mitigate climate change.
B. Displacement
The Alec L. court also incorrectly relied on AEP in its mistaken conclusion that federal
statute—namely the CAA—displaces public trust claims. Congress has, to be sure, permissibly
87 Id. at 536 (quoting Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1886)).
88 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1258 (D. Or. 2016).
89 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in City of Boston, Suffolk County, Mass., 523 F. Supp. 120,
124 (D. Mass. 1981).
90 City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
91 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, More or Less, Located in San Diego County, Cal., 683 F.3d 1030,
1038 (9th Cir. 2012).
92 Id. at 1032–33.
93 Id. at 1039.
94 Id. at 1038.
95 Id. at 1033, 1039 n.2.
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legislated multiple common law rights and remedies into environmental statutes, extinguishing
their effect in federal courts.96 Accordingly, the inquiry in AEP required that the court determine
whether the statute “speaks directly” to the common-law nuisance question at issue.97
The PTD, however, is fundamentally different from the common-law nuisance claims
considered in AEP. As stated in Juliana and echoed in multiple Supreme Court cases, the PTD
implicates inherent limitations on sovereign power.98 As such, “the power of governing is a trust
committed by the people to the government, no part of which can be granted away”99—that is,
without destroying the sovereign itself.100 The PTD, given its unique nature as a limit on
legislative power, is therefore not subject to displacement analysis, whereas common-law
environmental rights typically are.101 Rather, the only inquiry for a public trust claim is “whether
the sovereign is protecting trust assets sufficiently to safeguard the interest of present and future
beneficiaries.”102 This is entirely different from the inquiry in AEP stated above.
Several state supreme courts agree that the PTD invokes inherent matters of sovereignty
that cannot be legislated or granted away. For example, the Hawai’i Supreme Court described its
constitutionally grounded PTD as “an inherent attribute of sovereign authority that the
government . . . ‘cannot surrender.’”103 It went on to reason that the “suggestion that such a statute
could extinguish the public trust . . . contradicts the doctrine’s basic premise, that the state has
certain powers and duties which it cannot legislatively abdicate.”104 The Arizona Supreme Court
came to a similar conclusion: “[t]he public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on
legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. . . .”105 The court
then added that “[t]he Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its
authority.”106
96 See, e.g., AEP, 564 U.S. 410, 416 (2011) (holding that the CAA displaces federal common-law public-
nuisance claims); Int’l Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act pre-empts state
nuisance common-law claims against out-of-state sources of water pollution); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
317–19 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water Act displaces federal common law of nuisance as applied to claims brought
by a state).; Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1981) (applying City of
Milwaukee in finding that the Clean Water Act pre-empts federal common-law nuisance claims made by individuals);
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on AEP in holding that the CAA
displaces federal common-law public nuisance claim against energy companies for climate-change-related land erosion);
Anderson v. Teck Metals, Ltd., No. CV-13-420-LRS, 2015 WL 59100, at *10, 28 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2015) (applying
Kivalina in holding that CERCLA displaces federal common-law public nuisance claim).
97 AEP, 564 U.S. at 424.
98 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224, 1252 (D. Or. 2016); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997) (“[N]avigable waters uniquely implicate sovereign interests.”); Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981) (“[T]he ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty.”).
99 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879).
100 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
101 In several environmental cases, federal common-law nuisance claims have failed due to being displaced
by federal statutes. See cases cited supra note 96.
102 BLUMM & SCHAFFER, supra note 71, at 419.
103 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000).
104 Id. at 442–43.
105 San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999).
106 Id.
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There is broad judicial support for the notion that the PTD is inherent in sovereignty and
is thus immune from statutory displacement. This makes public trust claims innately different
from common law claims, such as that considered in AEP, which can be, and often are, legislated
away in environmental statutes like the CAA.107 The Alec L. court was therefore incorrect in its
conclusion; Judge Aiken correctly stated in Juliana that the CAA—and any statute, for that
matter—does not and cannot displace the plaintiffs’ public trust claim.108
C. The PTD and Constitutional Due Process
Framing the PTD as a right predating and secured by the Due Process Clauses of and
Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution further fortifies the idea of a federal public trust. In
this way, the Juliana court was correct in finding that the plaintiffs’ public trust claim may be
asserted in federal court.
Public trust rights are enforceable against the federal government because, as Judge
Aiken stated, “public trust rights both predated the Constitution and are secured by it.”109 As one
commentator puts it, the PTD “is the chalkboard on which the Constitution is written.”110 It
implicates the Constitution’s grounding in the Social Contract theory; this nation’s citizens
granted the federal government sovereignty over its commonly held natural resources in exchange
for the government’s promise to protect those resources in trust for the nation’s benefit.111 In other
words, the government’s obligations to protect public trust resources for its citizens’ welfare are
so old that they were preserved, rather than created, by the U.S. Constitution.
It is because the Supreme Court and many other American courts recognize the PTD as a
restraint on a government’s sovereignty (as discussed above) that it must have been preserved by
the Constitution. At the time of the nation’s founding, the federal government obtained its land,
waters, and air from the King of England—which were, even then, recognized as bound by the
PTD. If public trust rights were not enshrined in the Constitution when it was drafted, then the
PTD’s core purpose—to restrict state sovereignty—would be meaningless.
In addition to predating the Constitution, public trust rights are preserved by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Ninth Amendment.
Framing public trust rights as a matter of due process provides further support for the plaintiffs in
Alec L. and Juliana.
Although this Note does not fully analyze Judge Aiken’s recognition of a substantive due
process right to a stable climate system, the PTD, as a preliminary matter, has basis in the Due
Process Clauses. First, Judge Aiken was correct in equating the fundamental importance of a
stable climate system with that of the institution of marriage, as recognized in Obergefell. Justice
Kennedy in Obergefell quoted the Court’s prior holding that marriage is the “foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”112 If this
was the basis on which he recognized a fundamental right to marry regardless of sexual
107 See cases cited supra note 96.
108 See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1260.
109 Id. at 1260.
110 TONES & BELLINGER, supra note 61, at 288.
111 See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d. at 1253.
112 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
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orientation, then a fundamental right to a functioning climate system must surely exist as well. A
stable global climate is too, and perhaps more so than marriage, the “foundation of the family and
of society”;113 it ensures that American citizens have enough water to drink, food to eat, and air to
breathe. Without such basic human necessities, “there would be neither civilization nor
progress.”114 To grip the truth of this statement, one need only ponder the catastrophic harm that
could ensue if our climate system was unstable—the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina and its
aftermath is one of many examples of this threat.
Moreover, rights guaranteed under the PTD are fundamental liberties protected as a
matter of due process because they are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”115 As
discussed above, the PTD predates the Constitution; it is a vestige of ancient Roman law that was
firmly implanted into American law with this nation’s independence from England.116 For over a
century, it has been recognized as an inherent limit on the sovereignty of both numerous states
and the federal government. If this does not qualify as rooted in this nation’s jurisprudential
history, then little else does.
Another source of constitutional protection for the PTD is the Ninth Amendment, which
provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”117 The Constitution does not expressly grant
rights traditionally preserved under the PTD. Yet, as explained, a court may interpret the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to provide protection of public trust
rights. Therefore, the Ninth Amendment lends further constitutional basis for the right to a stable
climate system.
In further support of the Juliana court’s holding, Judge Aiken made it a point to restrict
the scope of the right she recognized to “provide some protection against the constitutionalization
of all environmental claims”118:
This Court simply holds that where a complaint alleges governmental action is
affirmatively and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will
cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to
property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s
ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process violation.119
This is reasonable because it does not allow plaintiffs to assert that minor acts of
environmental degradation or climate instability violate their constitutional rights. Rather, it
provides protection against substantial damage and global harm. “To hold otherwise would be to
say that the Constitution affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to poison
the air its citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink.”120
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
116 See supra Part II.A.
117 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
118 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 1224, 1250. (D. Or. 2016).
119 Id.
120 Id.
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D. Why is Juliana Important? ( Public Policy Considerations
Important matters of judicial efficiency, public policy, and political reality further
support the Juliana court’s conclusions. For one thing, federal courts’ erroneous failure to
recognize a federal public trust will engender inconsistent case law at the state level. This is a
paltry solution to an issue as universal in scope as climate change. Additionally, given the clear
anti-environmental stance of the Trump administration and Republican-controlled Congress, the
judiciary is likely the only branch of government that will spur federal action on climate change in
the near term. Yet, regardless of the outcome of the Juliana litigation, public exposure of the
evidence the plaintiffs will likely request during discovery will be impactful, given the current
political climate.
i. Increased State-Level Litigation
There is a strong incentive for climate-change plaintiffs to bring public-trust climate
change suits in the courts of certain states than in federal court.121 If the claims in Juliana are
ultimately dismissed in line with Alec L., the incentive to sue in state courts will intensify,
generating a potentially inconsistent string of litigation around the nation. Yet precedents and
remedies varying from state to state would be a piecemeal, insufficient solution to an issue as
global as climate change. The effects of climate change do not stop at state borders, so why should
the obligations under the PTD? Rather, a more effective approach would be one unifying
precedent that allows federal courts to declare the United States a trustee in protecting its citizens
from climate change. Juliana can serve as this unifying precedent.
ii. Political Concerns
Additionally, given the November 2016 elections, Juliana perhaps represents the sole
front on which there is potential for federal action on climate change for the foreseeable future.
President Donald Trump appointed Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, a climate change
skeptic who led numerous legal attacks against the EPA, as the Agency’s current Administrator.122
The President has also vowed to scrap EPA’s landmark Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) (which would
121 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of
all the people. . . . As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.”); King v. Oahu Railway & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 725 (1899) (“The people of Hawaii hold the absolute
rights to all its navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the navigable waters
in and around the territory of the Hawaiian Government are held in trust for the public uses of navigation.”); Foster v.
Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015) (recognizing that the state has a public
trust duty to protect natural resources from climate change).
122 Chris Mooney et al., Trump names Scott Pruitt, Oklahoma Attorney General Suing EPA on Climate
Change, to Head the EPA, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/12/07/trump-names-scott-pruitt-oklahoma-attorney-general-suing-epa-on-climate-change-to-head-
the-epa/?utm_term=.2337f4599503 [https://perma.cc/PCK2-2SF8]. Pruitt was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on February
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regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants), among other regulations,123 as
well as to withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement.124 He even famously
stated on Twitter in 2012 that “[t]he concept of global warming was created by and for the
Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”125 Based on the President’s
actions thus far, it is safe to assume that a Trump-led executive branch will do little to nothing in
terms of creating policy or enacting legislation to combat climate.
Republicans also control both houses of Congress and have consistently stalled all
attempts for passing federal climate change legislation during both Obama administrations. Thus,
it is likely that Congress will pass legislation to both undo climate progress made under the
Obama administrations and prevent future action. Within the context of the CPP, as one of
multiple examples, Congress may pass legislation repealing the CPP, or it could amend the CAA
to remove both EPA’s authority to implement the CPP and citizens’ right to enforce the CAA on
their own.126 Congress could also cut EPA’s enforcement budget in the annual appropriations
process, rendering the CPP essentially ineffective.127
Juliana is therefore crucial for those who desire swifter action on climate change for the
coming few years. If it proceeds, Juliana would potentially render the judiciary the sole source
across the federal government of a push for action on climate change. If Juliana fails, then all
federal climate change activities may fail along with it under the Trump administration and
Republican-controlled Congress.
Regardless of the eventual outcome of the case, however, putting the evidence the
Juliana plaintiffs seek on trial would be monumental in its own right. During discovery, the
Juliana plaintiffs will likely request from multiple federal agencies records of climate change
research, collusion with industry to conceal or refute it, and other efforts which indicate either
knowing acceleration of or failure to combat climate change. At trial, this evidence may compel
the U.S. government to acknowledge human-induced climate change, and its contributing role in
it, in federal court—an impactful admission in the Trump era.
The evidence may further suggest that the federal government for decades had an
unethical relationship with private industry, favoring business over the public in breach of its
fiduciary public trust duty. This could implicate former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, as before
joining the Trump cabinet, he chaired the American Petroleum Institute—one of the intervenors
on behalf of the government in Juliana.128 In this way, evidence from this case may bolster other
123 Kyle Feldscher, Trump would Repeal Clean Power Plan, Other Big EPA Regs, WASH. EXAM’R (Sept.
15, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-would-repeal-clean-power-plan-other-big-epa-regs/article/2601931
[https://perma.cc/ADT6-THZP].
124 Matt McGrath, Donald Trump would !Cancel’ Paris Climate Deal, BBC NEWS (May 27, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36401174. [https://perma.cc/24SQ-66KN].
125 German Lopez, Donald Trump Absolutely Did Say Global Warming is a Chinese Hoax, VOX (Sept. 26,
2016), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/9/26/13067910/presidential-debate-clinton-trump-global-warming-
hoax [https://perma.cc/R2WD-9FW].
126 Thomas A. Lorenzen & Sherrie A. Armstrong, Change in Administrations, Change in Course? The
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related suits around the nation. For example, the Attorneys General of New York and
Massachusetts are both investigating Exxon Mobil Corp.—of which Rex Tillerson was formerly
the CEO—for potentially concealing from investors the financial risks of climate change.129
Even if the plaintiffs cannot prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
public scrutiny of such evidence would be crucial. In the name of holding former public officials
such as Rex Tillerson accountable, citizens—the beneficiaries of the public trust—ought to be
aware of the government’s performance in executing its duties as trustee. The discovery in Juliana
may thus do much in the way of government transparency, irrespective of whether the Juliana
plaintiffs ultimately prevail.
III. CONCLUSION – THE FUTURE OF THE PTD IN FEDERAL CLIMATE LITIGATION
As it currently stands, the PTD faces an uncertain future in federal court. The Supreme
Court statement in PPL Montana and its accompanying precedents, however misguided they may
be, are clear—for now—that the PTD is not based in federal law. Juliana’s holding that public
trust rights are Due Process rights under the U.S. Constitution is unprecedented in American
law.130 This leaves a reviewing court with little precedent to guide its inquiry. Yet Juliana may
have a strong chance of survival due to its novel constitutional elements and other key practical
concerns.
One crucial determinant of the PTD’s future success in federal court will be the Supreme
Court’s re-evaluation of the statement in PPL Montana that the PTD is a state-law matter. If
challenged, the Court will be required to analyze the language in Appleby interpreting Illinois
Central, which was subsequently quoted in Coeur d’Alene and then again in PPL Montana.
Despite the consistency of the line of cases, future plaintiffs can make a compelling case for its
reversal: these cases were based on a scant analysis, and none explicitly considered the existence
of a federal public trust.131 If nothing else, the novelty of the issue should convince the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari to such a suit.
However, the Court may require a vote from Justice Anthony Kennedy to overturn this
precedent—potentially an insurmountable task. Given President Trump’s appointment of Neil
Gorsuch—a fourth conservative justice—to fill the spot vacated by the late Justice Antonin
Scalia,132 Justice Kennedy will represent the Court’s fifth swing vote. Yet Justice Kennedy
authored both majority opinions in Coeur d’Alene and PPL Montana. Given this, it will likely be
difficult to convince him to vote for a reversal of his reasoning in those cases.
13, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-environment-tillerson-idUSKBN14X2KF [https://perma.cc/796P-993M].
129 Erik Larson, Exxon Dealt a Blow as Texas Judge Sends Climate Suit to N.Y., BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-29/exxon-dealt-a-blow-as-texas-judge-sends-climate-suit-to-
new-york [https://perma.cc/5BT9-YCJB].
130 Keith Goldberg, Landmark Climate Suit Likely to be Tested on Appeal, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/862482/landmark-climate-suit-likely-to-be-tested-on-appeal [https://perma.cc/Q8UE-
8Y8D].
131 See supra Parts III.A.i–ii.
132 Ryan Black & Ryan Owens, Neil Gorsuch Could Be the Most Conservative Justice on the Supreme
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Moreover, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to the plaintiffs in Alec L. after
their argument for a federal public trust was struck down without a formal opinion by the D.C.
Circuit.133 This could bode poorly for a suit containing the assertion of a federal public trust, as
the Supreme Court has already once rejected an opportunity to opine on the matter—and it has no
obligation to decide any differently come a second opportunity.
Framing public trust claims as a matter of substantive due process may, however, provide
a more successful path forward for Juliana plaintiffs and others like them. Juliana’s
unprecedented recognition of a constitutional right to a stable climate system134 may provide the
impetus needed for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Juliana is among the first suits to have
recognized a fundamental due process right in the wake of the landmark Obergefell decision, and
the Supreme Court will thus desire to provide further clarification on the new framework. Also,
the Court’s body of cases on environmental public trust rights is rather small and, as discussed
earlier, does not directly consider the existence of a federal public trust, despite the doctrine’s long
history in American law. These legal issues in combination make Juliana ripe for Supreme Court
consideration.
It is true that Juliana may be a legal long shot; it is essentially the only federal case of its
kind and contains significant constitutional implications.135 However, the substantive due process
right recognized in Juliana ought to be upheld even if appealed to the Supreme Court (which is
predicted)136 and given the confirmation of Neil Gorsuch as the Court’s fourth conservative
justice. The Juliana court’s due process analysis relied extensively on Obergefell, which was
authored by Justice Kennedy—the likely fifth swing vote for the Juliana plaintiffs. The gravity of
Obergefell could be enough to compel Justice Kennedy to side with the Juliana plaintiffs and
repudiate the language he included in Coeur d’Alene and PPL Montana rejecting the existence of
a federal public trust. The notion that the government maintains a healthy environment in trust for
the benefit of its citizens at its core is so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” that
without it, “there would be neither civilization nor progress.”137 It would be plainly illogical to
preclude the federal government from protecting such crucial rights when the states have been
obliged to do so for over a century.
133 Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014).
134 See Goldberg, supra note 130.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601
(2015) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
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